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This paper tests the somewhat counterintuitive hypothesis that public firms are more efficient than their 
private sector counterparts. A factor analysis (9 industrial groups/34 industries) indicated that for all 
Pakistani provinces, public enterprises contributed relatively more value added which supports the 
findings of Naqvi and Kamal. The paper also concludes that a policy to reduce Pakistan's regional 
income disparities by privatizing public enterprises would likely be ineffective. 
1. Introduction 
For many developing countries, the 1980s saw widespread attempts by policy makers to 
curtail the state's economic role. A common policy was large scale privatization of public 
enterprises. This divestiture was an attempt to reverse policies of the 1960s and 1970s when 
policy makers bad emphasized direct state intervention to try and correct perceived failures in 
private markets (van de Walle, 1989). The arguments for privatization are well known in 
terms of its impact on economic efficiency and national output since private firms are assumed 
to be more efficient than public enterprises (Goodman, 1985; Hanke, 1987; Butler, 1985). Not 
so much is known about the success rate of privatization attempts across a broad spectrum of 
developing countries. The inability to measure success (or failure) of privatization is often due 
to the lack of reliable and meaningful data. 
There have been several studies looking at the private/public issue in Pakistan. While the 
papers are discussed in more detail in the following section, it is fair to say that the picture as 
to success or failure of privatization is "mixed." For example, some economists like Sa rm ad 
(1984) and Mehdi (1991) support the intuitive logic that public enterprises are less profitable 
than private sector enterprises. Other economists such as Kay and Thomson, (1986) find that 
the gains from privatization are more tempered. An important recent study by Naqvi and 
Kamal (1991) find that public enterprises in Pakistan are more efficient than their privately-
owned counterparts. 
*The opinions expressed here are not necessarily those of the U.S. Department of Defense or the 
Naval Postgraduate School. The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees for helpful 
comments. 
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This paper tests the somewhat counterintuitive hypothesis that public firms are more 
efficient than their private sector counterparts. Hopefully the results of this analysis will a) 
shed additional light on the conclusion of Naqvi and Kemal's study on public sector efficiency, 
b) suggest some reasons for the disparity in efficiency between the two sectors, and c) 
determine whether privatization could serve as an effective way of correcting regional 
imbalances in Pakistan - an approach not yet examined in the literature. As no useful statistics 
are published on technical efficiency - either at the firm or industry level - the authors use a 
large number of Census measures to calculate various dimensions of firm diversity. The major 
factors which distinguish private from public firms in Pakistan are examined to determine 
whether or not private enterprises are more efficient in terms of generating more value added 
than their public sector counterparts. 
2. Review of the Literature 
As noted, the papers by Sarmad (1984) and Mehdi (1991) support the proposition that 
private sector enterprises are more profitable than their public sector counterparts. One major 
drawback of these studies is that profitability ratios are used which, in the authors' opinion, 
have serious drawbacks. For example, profits are not adjusted for the wider social and 
economic objectives of public enterprises. Rees (1986) and Hemming and Mansoor (1988) 
joined Kay and Thompson (1986) in suggesting that the efficiency gains from privatization 
will be modest and, for the most part, limited to reductions in productive and regulatory 
inefficiencies. Naqvi and Kemal (1991) examine the case for privatization of public 
enterprises in Pakistan by comparing the efficiency levels in enterprises producing similar 
goods. Naqvi and Kemal showed that allocative and productive efficiency is based more on 
management quality than ownership, and that while a few public enterprises experienced 
losses, most of them were profitable. The profitability was not a function of industry 
protection but was due largely to high capacity utilization. The authors showed that the 
effective rate of protection was lower for public enterprises and that they face competition 
from both imports and the private sector. While the present authors consider this to be an 
important study, Naqvi and Kemal generally used company financial data (with associated 
inter-firm problems such accounting practice compatibility) to arrive at their conclusions. A 
major purpose of this paper is to confirm the findings by Naqvi and Kemal by using a different 
(macroeconomic) approach and different data set. 
Other studies have failed to look at regional manufacturing in conjunction with private or 
public ownership. However several st\Jdies have produced some valuable insights into the 
regional pattern of industrialization. Chaudhary (1990) found that a regional disparity in 
output existed and that the pattern of inequality declined until 1979-80 but bas since increased. 
The same trend is expected through the Seventh Plan although investment may shift from the 
Sindh to other regions depending on local unrest in the province. In terms of per capita output, 
Chaudhary noticed an increasing disparity among provinces. Cbaudhary's findings are 
important since appropriate government policy measures could apparently be employed to 
stem the increasing regional disparity and develop backward areas. 
Arshad (1989) focused on the regional dimension of industrialization and ranked each 
province by eight different indicators of industrialization over time -- 1970/71, 1976/77 (to 
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examine the effect of secession), and 1985/6 (the last year of available data ).1 Arshad's study 
suggested that Sindh was Pakistan's most industrialized region with Punjab in second place. 
Importantly, Arshad found no tangible change in the regional pattern of industrialization over 
time except for a slight improvement in employment and factory concentration in Baluchistan. 
He concluded that enforcement of industrial programs between 1970/71 and 1984/85 have 
been largely ineffective in reducing regional disparities in industrialization. 
An alternative policy available to the Pakistan government is the privatization of public 
sector enterprises. As inefficient public operations are transferred to private ownership, 
higher retained earnings would presumably be generated and followed by a more rapid rate of 
investment growth. This paper also examines this policy option in detail by examining how 
private and public firms differ by region. 
3. Methodology 
In Pakistan, differences between public and private sector industrial firms can take many 
forms such as differences in capital/]abor ratios, size, efficiency of resource use, productivity 
of capital, and the like. However there is little consensus on the most meaningful way to 
define these differences and even less agreement on the best way to define the differences. For 
example, should "size" be measured as number of workers per firm or as the value of fixed 
assets per establishment? Since each measure provides a different picture and in order to 
identify and assess the difference between private and public firms in Pakistan, a set of widely 
used industrial statistics and measures of output, costs, and performance from the most recent 
annual Census of Manufacturing Industries (1985/6, 198617) were collected for nine 
industrial groups and further subdivided into 34 different industries. 2 The raw data consisted 
of the following measures: 
1. Number of reporting establishments 
2. Value of fixed assets year end 
3. Change in stocks 
4. Average number of daily employment 
5. Average number of daily employment including contract labor 
6. Average cost of daily employment including contract labor 
7. Annual industrial cost 
8. Annual production 
9. Annual value added • 
To enable comparisons across industries, several of the variables were transformed to 
create thirteen variables as follows: 
1Value added per worker by sector, share of provincial manufacturing output, large scale 
employment per population, large scale manufacturing and number of factories per square kilometer, 
percent of employment in large scale manufacturing, and capital employed per worker. 
2See Appendix. 
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1-5: value added - per cost of labor, per unit of capital, per industrial cost, per worker, 
and per firm 
6-9: labor costs, workers, capital, and industrial costs per firm 
10-11: industrial costs and capital per worker 
12: industrial costs per unit of capital 
13: capital per labor costs 
Each variable is identified by province and by ownership pattern - private (individual, 
partnership, and private limited company) or public (public limited company, cooperative 
society, federal/provincial/local government ownership). 
Since no doubt many of the transformed variables overlap, a factor analysis was used to 
identify the main dimensions of firm diversity. This data reduction into several "factors" 
provides a limited number of independent (uncorrelated) composite measures. For example, 
measures such as employment, sales, value added and capital stock are replaced by a 
composite factor and factor score (index) which depicts the relative size of sample firms. 
While the factor analysis provided some initial insights as to bow public and private firms 
differ, a discriminant analysis was conducted to determine which factors were statistically 
important in distinguishing public from private sector firms. 
4. Results of Factor and Discriminant Analysis 
The factor analysis generated four main factors: value added, size, capital intensity and 
industrial costs. The value added factor combines (into one factor) all measures which use the 
value added variable.3 Eigenvalues for each of the four factors are reported by province in 
Table 1, Part A. 4 For all provinces except Baluchistan, the variability among industries is best 
explained by the value added factor, followed by the size factor. For Baluchistan, the size 
factor best explained variability followed by industrial costs. 
Since the paper's primary interest is to assess income changes which might result from 
privatization, the authors further examined the value added factor since this seemed to be the 
best indicator of likely income changes. Value added factor scores were calculated for all 
firms. Table 1, Part B reports the results by ownership and by province where the value added 
factor score was greater than one - a measure of efficiency. In every case public firms 
exhibited a higher value added factor score - with the greatest percentage difference (27 
percent) in the Punjab and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). 
To further identify differences belween public and private manufacturing firms, size, 
capital intensity and industrial cost factor scores were calculated (Table 2). After controlling 
for whether the firm is a heavy or light industry and for the average skill level required in the 
industry, a striking pattern emerges: in addition to generating relatively more income, the 
public firms in the Punjab, the Sindb and Baluchistan are also larger, more capital intensive, 
3Correlations of each factor with the remaining factors is not reported but is available, together with 
a complete set of subsequent results, from the authors. 
40nly factors with Eigen values > 1 are reported. 
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Table 1 
Eigen Values, Relative Efficiency, Factor Entry Order 
and Probability of Correct Grouping 
PUNJAB SINDH NWFP BALUCHISTAN 
A: Eigen Values 
Factors: 
Value Added 5.06 4.47 5.37 2.42 
Size 2.90 3.07 2.98 5.21 
Capital Intensity 1.71 1.23 1.87 1.52 
Industrial Costs 1.71 2.21 1.63 3.07 
B: Efficient Firms [Value Added Factor Score > 1] 
Private Firms 1.09 1.23 1.09 1.38 
Public Firms 1.39 1.40 1.39 1.67 
Average 1.20 1.30 1.22 1.50 
C: Order of Entry in Discriminant Analysis 
FactorsNariable: 
Value Added 2 5 5 4 
Size 1 2 1 1 
Capital Intensity 5 4 2 4 
Industrial Costs 3 2 
Heavy/Light 4 3 4 5 
Industry 
Skills 3 1 3 
D: Probability of Correct Grouping 
Probability 86.98 79.97 94.5 92.86 
and greater users of industrial materials. There is little difference in whether the public 
enterprise is in a light or heavy industry although the average skill level of the work force 
employed in the public sector is considerably higher than the counterpart firms in the private 
sector. The same overall pattern holds for the NWFP except that the industrial costs factor 
(industrial costs per worker and per firm, and capital per worker) are higher for private firms. 
These results - that public firms g~nerate more income, employ higher skilled workers, 
and generally have lower industrial costs - support Naqvi and Kemal. Apparently the quality 
of management, competition from imports and the private sector, lower effective rates of 
protection, high rates of capacity utilization in public enterprises (posited by Naqvi and 
Kemal), and other factors such as higher job security and prestige in public enterprises or the 
employment of higher skilled workers and lower industrial costs (as indicated in the factor 
analysis) all contribute to the superior efficiency of the public firm. 
The factor analysis implies that public and private firms have unique structural and 
performance characteristics which set them apart. If this is correct, a discriminant analysis 
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Table 2 
Average Factor Scores, Control Variable Values, 
Private and Public Firms, by Province 
Factors Heavy/Light Average Industry Skill Level 
Size Capital Industrial 
Intensity Costs 
PUNJAB 
Private -0.46 -0.13 0.03 1.57 13.49 
Public 0.80 0.22 .05 1.55 22.50 
Mean 0 0 0 1.56 16.77 
SINDH 
Private -0.32 -0.12 -0.13 1.53 19.74 
Public 0.47 0.18 0.20 1.60 28.10 
Mean 0 0 0 1.56 23.13 
NWFP 
Private -0.64 -0.21 0.13 1.31 13.07 
Public 0.86 0.28 -0.17 1.22 17.51 
Mean 0 0 0 1.27 14.96 
BALUCHISTAN 
Private -0.54 -0.25 -0.30 1.38 20.10 
Public 0.73 0.34 0.40 1.33 26.24 
Mean 0 0 0 1.36 22.73 
Note: Mean of Heavy/Light Industry and Skill Levels does not equal zero since they are control variables 
and not factor scores. 
should support this finding and classify firms into their appropriate ownership category with 
a high degree of probability. Operationally, the procedure includes (in a step-wise manner) 
the scores of each of the main factors (or control variables) so that the factor which provides 
the highest differentiating power is selected first. The procedure continues until it is 
impossible for an additional variable to make a statistically significant improvement (based on 
the F statistic) in the group delineation.5 The order of entry for the factors and control 
variables are shown in Table 1, Part <;. The results indicate that size is the most important 
discriminating variable in all provinces except Sindh. 
Discriminant analysis allows us to predict the correct grouping (public or private) given 
the values of the various structural descriptors. The probability of correct grouping appears as 
Table 1, Part D and range from 94.5 percent for the NWFP to approximately 80 percent for the 
Sindh. 
51.ight industry = 1.0 (food, textiles, wood products, and paper products). Heavy industry= 2.0 
(chemical, non-metallic mineral products, basic metal industries, and metal/products/machinery 
industries. Skills were proxied by the employment cost per worker. 
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5. Logistic Regression 
On the one hand the initial analysis shows remarkable consistency - the efficiency of 
public over private firms across the provinces - but on the other hand indicates some diversity 
- such as the relative importance of each factor in the discriminant analysis. To further test the 
strength of these results, several equations were estimated using logistic regression to (a) 
measure the relative strength of each factor or control variable and to (b) estimate the 
prediction probability of correct grouping. 6 Ownership is the dependent variable and assumes 
a value of 1 for private firms and 2 for public firms. While several set of equations were 
estimated (for sets of firms with value added factor scores> 0.5, > 0, and> -0.25, respectively), 
only the results for one set of firms (value added factor score > 0) are reported since the results 
were consistent across the three sets. The results appear as Table 3.7 For the Punjab, 
differentials in value added between public and private firms were an important element in 
characterizing the two ownership patterns. Since the estimated coefficient is positive, public 
firms were ceteris paribus contributed more to income than their private counterparts. Size 
and capital intensity were also statistically significant in profiling ownership. For the Sindh 
and the NWFP, value added was not statistically significant. In these provinces, size, capital 
intensity, industrial costs, and the type of industry (heavy or light) were important in 
distinguishing ownership. In Sindb and NWFP, production by public firms was concentrated 
in the lighter industries as evidenced by the negative coefficient. The average skills level was 
only important in the Sindh. Based on a limited number of variables, this model predicted 
correct ownership at least 92% of the time. 
6. Conclusions 
A major purpose of this study was to confirm the findings of Naqvi and Kemal on the 
relatively higher efficiency of public over private enterprises in Pakistan by using a different 
methodology and different data set. Public and private firms were examined to see bow they 
differ across the provinces of Pakistan. The major focus bas been on the relative ability of each 
to contribute to regional value added. Since no published statistics for Pakistan exist which 
indicate technical efficiency at the firm or industry level, a proxy measure - a value added 
factor - was developed by factor analysis together with other indicators of manufacturing 
activity. Several striking patterns of ownership emerged which have important implications 
should the government of Pakistan embark on a program of privatization. Importantly, the 
findings of Naqvi and Kemal are confKmed since the results indicate that public firms are 
more efficient in the sense of generating more value added than their private sector 
counterparts. This conclusion holds across all provinces. In addition, value added 
differentials (especially in the Punjab) are a critical factor in distinguishing ownership. Since 
public firms contribute more value added, privatization per se would most likely contribute 
little in increased output or to improvements in industrial productivity. If Arshad's 
6For a good description of this procedure, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976). 
7There were insufficient observations to estimate the model for Baluchistan. 
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Table3 
Logistic Regression Results by Province, Coefficient and Standard Errors• 
Independent Variable Regression Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
PUNJAB SINDII NWFP 
Value Added 1.92 0.34 0.10 
(0.43)••• (0.38) (1.13) 
Size 8.15 12.34 5.53 
(1.07) ... (1.23)••• (1.12)••• 
Capital Intensity 1.14 2.89 1.93 
(0.19)••• (0.67)••• (0.43)* .. 
Industrial Costs 0.21 3.35 -2.65 
(0.12)* (0.29)* .. (1.12)** 
Heavy/Light Industry 0.18 -1.17 -1.64 
(0.39) (0.36)••• (0.99)* 
Skills 0.02 0.05 0.17 
(0.04) (0.02)** (0.12) 
Prediction of Correct 92.36% 92.27% 95.14% 
Grouping 
• Note: values in parentheses are standard errors. •, ••,and •••,represent statistical 
significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. 
view is accepted that the Sindh is the most industrialized region, privatization in the Punjab 
would do little to restore regional balance. 
For somewhat different reasons, the same conclusion holds true in Sindh province. Value 
added differences are not such a critical factor and while privatization would shift workers of 
higher skills into the private sector, it is not clear whether these skill differentials would 
represent real productivity differences. For the more backward regions of the NWFP and 
Baluchistan province, privatization appears to offer little prospect for speeding up 
industrialization since value added differences are not that significant in differentiating public 
from private firms. Perhaps privatization in these provinces would make more skilled workers 
available to the private sector. Yet it is not clear - given possible subsequent out-migration -
whether private firms could retain 
these workers. 
This paper confirms the relative efficiency of public sector enterprises in Pakistan. In 
addition, the policy of privatization of public enterprises bas been examined to estimate 
whether such a policy could reduce regional income disparities in Pakistan. The findings 
suggest that privatization of public enterprises is unlikely to be an effective means to reach this 
goal. 
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